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State of the Field: Using Economics to Explain the Civil War’s Outcome
“The North can make a steam engine, locomotive, or railway car; hardly a
yard of cloth or pair of shoes can you make… You are bound to fail. Only in
your spirit and determination are you prepared for war. In all else you are totally
unprepared, with a bad cause to start with. At first you will make headway, but
as your limited resources begin to fail, shut out from the markets of Europe as
you will be, your cause will begin to wane. If your people will but stop and
think, they must see in the end that you will surely fail."1
As William T. Sherman reputedly declared in December 1860, economics
would eventually dictate the outcome of the impending war. The North had the
men, the materiel, the industry, and the transportation and distribution systems to
fight; the South had exports and ideals. By some accountings, as in Sherman’s,
the result was practically foreordained.
Nothing is inevitable, however. Had the Confederacy (the CSA) found an 
ally in Great Britain—and maintained the market for its exports—the result 
might have been very different. Capital from cotton could have provided many 
of the nation’s needs, but the Confederacy at first embargoed its staple, hoping to 
make Britain choose sides. By 1863, English textile manufacturers had found 
new sources of cotton supplies in Egypt, India, and Brazil. Moreover, the 
northern blockade of southern ports threatened the Confederacy’s intercourse 
with the outside world. Though the impact and effectiveness of the blockade 
remains a hotly debated topic, careful recent analysis concludes that it played a 
significant role in Confederate defeat, damaging especially internal commerce 
and the coastwise trade. Moving men and goods within the Confederacy, 
maintaining a navy, exporting cotton, and importing pig iron, arms, and 
consumer goods all struggled. As the Anaconda Plan tightened around the
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Confederacy, it also shrank as a result of military engagements and Union
occupation.2
In fact, however, for a year or more after Lincoln’s election, neither side was
really up to the task of extended war. Initial optimism rapidly gave way to the
reality of a long conflict. The two nations had different goals—southern leaders
sought independence while their counterparts in the north aimed to quell
secession and preserve the union. Nonetheless, the two sides had remarkably
similar political institutions within which their economies operated.
Secessionists viewed their nation as the true heir of the founding fathers, and
thus wrote a Constitution modeled on that of the United States. It forbade tariffs
to protect industry but allowed them as revenue measures—and the CSA rapidly
levied a tariff in spring of 1861. Both nations printed money and borrowed vast
sums. In both nations, the War Department was largely responsible for the
conflict, while a Quartermaster system handled logistics, supply and distribution.
The Confederate Quartermasters operated factories and workshops, employed
50,000 workers, and dictated price and policy terms even to private textile mills.
In other words, the South made larger attempts at government control of the
economy than did the North. The results, however, were poorer.3
Because neither the USA nor the CSA possessed a fully operational federal
bureaucracy in 1860-1861, the first years of mobilization depended heavily on
the states. In the North, Lincoln’s calls in April and May of 1861 to expand the
army from 16,000 to 156,000 resulted in a rush of enthusiastic volunteers, but
the individual states provided these troops (and the state militias) with uniforms,
equipment, arms, and garrisons. Massachusetts and New York—the most
abolitionist and the most well financed states, respectively—provided the most
troops, money, aid and expertise to the Union. Out west, things were much
worse. Less developed economies and conflicted loyalties may have slowed
support for the conflict in the Old Northwest. In Mark Geiger’s Missouri,
country banks in plantation districts provided money to Confederate
mobilization; when the state stayed in the Union, its planters lost their land and
became guerrilla warriors. In the South, the states provided the men, arms, and
equipment for the conflict through 1861, but fell back at different rates
thereafter. Despite early enthusiasm in the lower South, by 1863 the relations
between the states and the CSA had deteriorated and internal divisions prevented
adequate support for the war effort.4
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The two nations had comparable difficulties arming their soldiers in the first
few years of the war. Under Simon Cameron, Lincoln’s Secretary of War until
replaced by Edwin M. Stanton in January 1862, the Union failed to arm and
equip its soldiers adequately for battle and extended mobilization. The rifles and
muskets in the Union numbered 440,000 at the start of hostilities, compared to
150,000 in the Confederacy, but the rush by southern states to secure weapons at
first resulted in thievery, rapidly rising prices, and the seizure of inferior or
antiquated firearms. On both sides, the Navy Department did much better,
though the Union use of armored vessels, submarines, mines, and torpedoes, in
naval conflicts lagged that of the Confederacy. Early in 1862, however,
combined operations of Union army and navy forces resulted in significant
military victories, especially Fort Henry and Fort Donelson in Tennessee, which
cut river connections within the CSA and access to its northern reaches of the
Mississippi.5
Both nations needed their railroads, a milestone of this conflict’s modernity.
Railroad executives assisted the Union’s War Department from April 1861 on,
but the rates they set that summer led to charges of corruption and the
reorganization of the Department early in 1862. The government seized the
railroads in May 1862 but actually ran only a few lines. Herman Haupt and the
U.S. Military Railroad kept the railroads operational in the East, though the
Western Theater struggled until fall 1863. In the Confederacy (which contained
9,500 miles of railroads to the Union’s 21,000 miles), the “fatal hesitation" of the
government prevented optimal use and control of the rail system, despite a few
notable efforts and dramatic military successes. The Confederate railroads and
the navy both suffered from the lack of iron for maintenance and expansion.
Richmond worked with individual railroads, which led to wide variations in
coordination and control, while domestic iron producers (Tredegar, for example)
made more munitions than rails. Efforts to buy railroad equipment in Europe
received little aid from the War Department, so the roads cannibalized existing
systems to keep CSA trains running, albeit barely, until surrender.6
For some scholars, the CSA’s bid for independence stumbled due to 
financial failure—problems with the treasury, its monetary policy and taxes. It 
made no attempt to sell bonds abroad until summer 1862, and then retreated 
from that effort again in the fall. Its poor fiscal policies led to runaway inflation, 
even as goods became scarce for soldiers and civilians alike, chipping away at 
morale. “The Union taxed more and borrowed less," supported its greenbacks 
and suppressed competing currencies. Yet, for most historians, factor
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endowments mattered more than fiscal policy, and infrastructure and
organization even more than that. By September 1862, and the bloody battle of
Antietam, the economic distinctions between the warring nations had finally
reached the sorry point assumed in Sherman’s analysis two years earlier.7
Nonetheless, the Confederacy maintained the second largest army in the
world for four years of extended warfare over half a million square miles—an
achievement that undermines Sherman’s 1860 assumptions. By the end of 1861,
few people any longer thought the war’s outcome inevitable. While Union
victory and Confederate defeat certainly had economic components, the first few
years of the war did not immediately reveal the asymmetry between the sections
that Sherman and others assumed at the start of the conflict.8
---------------
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